



There is a nice twist of fate in the fact that at about the time in history that gold,
the metal, lost important characteristics that had made it so long a critically
important international monetary medium, Sir Joseph Gold, a leading expert on
international monetary law and then General Counsel at the International Mon-
etary Fund, was closely associated with the creation of a new fiduciary instrument
that may yet become the most important of the world's international moneys. At
the time in the 1960s when the continued convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold
(and hence the monetary system's link to the metal) was brought into question,
Sir Joseph was the chief draftsman and leading explicator of the First Amendment
to the charter of the Fund, composing words that brought into being and clarified
the Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR). While the Second Amendment to the
charter of the Fund, also chiefly Gold's words, significantly altered the Fund's
constitutional basis for operations and the position of the SDR, and while the future
evolution of the system is of course uncertain, there is good reason to believe that
the SDR has an important future and that Sir Joseph's work will prove to have been
a turning point in financial history. It is not inappropriate, therefore, in afestschrift
honoring Gold, the man, to appraise the progress of the SDR and the outlook for its
future, along with prospects for other forms of international money.
The SDR's early history did not satisfy the intent of its designers. Intended, at
least by U.S. officials, to be a source of liquidity for the major reserve center
countries that would enable them to maintain currency convertibility at existing
exchange rates, the SDR was too little and too late. Allocated to IMF member
countries for the first time in 1970, the SDR arrived on the scene when the days
of dollar convertibility into gold and the convertibility of other currencies into
dollars at fixed exchange rates already were numbered. Furthermore, the SDR
851 million U.S. share of the 1970 SDR 3.4 billion allocation was inadequate to
delay for long the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.
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Subsequent SDR distributions, in 1971 and 1972 and again in the three-year
allocation period 1979-1981, have brought the cumulative total of SDRs created
to SDR 21.4 billion. This amount is still less than 3.7 percent of total world
official monetary reserves in 1988, with the U.S. 1988 holdings comprising
about a third of the total. Between 1981 and 1989 policy makers' concerns with
the problem of inflation precluded further creation of the international fiduciary
asset.
While the SDR has not yet become a major component of world international
reserve money, it has nonetheless played a role in the economic history of the
period of its existence. Countries have, of course, used it as a reserve asset in the
Fund. For some countries, its exchange market value has been made the target
for exchange rate interventions. The SDR is the currency for price quotations in
a few markets and the denominator of the interest and maturity values of a
limited number of bond issues. It is the currency of denomination of some bank
deposits and other short-term claims, and it is the unit of account in IMF
bookkeeping.
The creation of Special Drawing Rights in the IMF completed a chapter of
monetary evolution that had been in progress since the period between the World
Wars and that has increasingly distinguished official international money from
private sector money. In the 1930s the recall of gold from private circulation in
the United States and some other countries had begun to distinguish moneys that
governments could use for international settlements from moneys that were
usable in the private sector. After 1934, gold became a medium available to the
United States Government for making international settlements but not available
to domestic residents for making payments. The design of the IMF, in which
drawing rights on the Fund could be used to obtain foreign exchange by
governments but not by private firms or individuals, completed the distinction.
In the SDR, authorized in 1969, the distinction between official and private
money was made, for that asset, universal and complete. Whereas gold, before
1934, along with other monetary assets that were held for official uses, had been
available for official purposes because it had value in private uses, SDRs had
value in official uses only by virtue of agreement among a limited number of
participating governments. SDRs are allocated only to governments and are held
only by governments, the IMF, and a few other designated international institu-
tions. Further, SDRs take the form of claims on the IMF that are transferrable,
with some limitations, only among the participating governments, the designated
institutions, and the IMF. Before the 1920s, the idea of official money distinct
from money used in open, private sector markets, had probably not been con-
sidered a realistic possibility. By the 1960s the change was profound and the
concept of such money was taken for granted.
Between the periods of the first three-year allocation of SDRs to participating
IMF member countries and the second, the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates broke down. Many governments opted to allow the exchange
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values of their currencies to float. As floating among currencies of the major
industrial countries was recognized to be a permanent arrangement, many
observers argued that demand for official international money would decline. For
exchange rates to be more market determined implied that governments would
intervene little to influence the course of the rates, and the exchange rates would
vary to equate, over short periods of time, the private sector demands and
supplies for various currencies. With the private markets clearing promptly, there
would be few official settlements to make.
But nearly free floating did not emerge, as indeed it probably should not have
been expected to do. Every government, except the United States, intervened in
the exchange markets soon after the day that each in turn had announced it had
abandoned fixed and preannounced intervention levels. And in the managed
floating system that has emerged it is clear that money has all of its traditional
roles to play on the international level, both for private and official purposes.
The traditional role of money is to provide services of three sorts: one is to
serve as a standard, or unit of measure, for value; a second is to serve as a
medium of exchange obviating barter; and the third is to function as a medium
for storing value through time. Various international moneys provide some or all
of these services both on official account and on private account. To illustrate the
international roles of money, consideration is given to the ways in which some
currently used instruments are employed.
At the official level, the measure of value function of international money may
be thought of as the use of one or more instruments as the numeraire or
numeraires of the values of other moneys. The dollar was, at the end of the
Second World War, the currency of the world's biggest trading country and of the
world's chief source of investment capital. In addition, to some degree that
currency became the alternate (with gold) numeraire of the par value system of
exchange rates under the unamended charter of the IMF. Hence, the U.S. dollar
came to serve, and survives today, as the most widely cited unit of common
measurement of the values of national currencies. Before the Second World War,
gold, and to some extent sterling, French francs and a few other currencies,
served this function. With the ending of the par value system of exchange rates
in the 1970s, gold ceased to be widely used for this purpose. The SDR now
serves in its place in some circumstances, and, within the European Monetary
System and beyond, the European Currency Unit (ECU) serves as a numeraire.
Identification of the moneys that serve the international medium of exchange
function at the official level is more involved. Often it is the national currency
that a government has chosen for exchange market intervention actions, and that
is acquired or held for that purpose, that serves as the official medium of
exchange. In these circumstances, the intervention currency is the means by
which a government insures the settlement of imbalances in payments between
holders of its currency and holders of other currencies at exchange rates in which
it has some choice. Of course, thanks to intercurrency arbitrage, a government
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need intervene in only a single currency in order to affect the exchange rates of
its currency against all other currencies. The dollar and a few other national
moneys are widely used as intervention currencies at the present time. But the
strictly official moneys, the SDR, and reserve positions in the International
Monetary Fund, may be presented for national currencies usable for exchange
market interventions. Hence, these currencies are also very close to being official
media of exchange even though they can only rarely be used directly for that
purpose-when international settlements happen to involve government to
government payments. Gold is in a special circumstance in that, while its use
was for a time circumscribed, there is now nothing to prevent governments from
selling it either to other governments or on the open market for currencies usable
for intervention purposes.
The store of value function of money at the official international level is seen
in the amount and composition of the official reserves of countries and interna-
tional institutions. Reserves are a tool for buffering changes in the flow of foreign
funds into and out of national economies; they are a means by which governments
store claims on the world obtained at one period of time until another. At the end
of 1987, total official reserves of IMF countries (with gold valued at the London
market price) were SDR 823.3 billion, composed 56.2 percent of national moneys
(foreign exchange), 3.7 percent of reserve positions in the Fund, 2.5 percent of
SDRs, and 37.6 percent of gold. Of the foreign exchange component, dollar
holdings were 67.1 percent, but that share was down from 73.2 percent at the end
of 1979.'
At the private level certain national moneys play an international, as well as
a domestic, role, and some moneys that are no nation's money have come into
use. Among national currencies, the dollar has been extensively used as an
international money since the Second World War, and sterling, the French franc,
the deutschemark, the Swiss franc, the yen, the Netherlands guilder, and a few
others have been variously used outside the countries of their issue. Since the
mid-1970s the SDR, the ECU, and some privately composed units valued as
indexes of national moneys have been utilized.
As a unit of account the dollar is often the denominator of exchange rate
quotations in the private sector. More importantly, it is often also the currency of
account in private merchandise and service trade, even trade in which U.S.
residents are not participants. The dollar is the most important currency of
denomination of international loans and the flows of service payments on them.
It is a common reference pricing medium for many relatively homogeneous
commodities, such as petroleum, gold, bananas, bauxite, coffee, and copper,
that are bought and sold in many parts of the world. It serves as well for services
where the homogeneity requirement suffices, as in the pricing of airline and other
1. Data on international reserves and their composition are from 1988 IMF ANN. REP. 66, 68,
(app. tables 1.1, 1.2).
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travel services. It is the use of the dollar by non-U.S. residents in transactions
with, or in conveying information to, other nonresidents that constitutes what is
here considered the international use of the dollar.
Nevertheless, the dollar is not alone in serving as a standard of value in
transactions where the unit of account is the currency of neither the buyer nor the
seller. Sterling presumably still has a place in some trade transactions involving
residents of former British colonies or Commonwealth countries, as does the
French franc in the francophone part of the world, and the yen in Asia. The SDR
and the ECU have had limited use as denominators of value in private current
account transactions but have been more widely used as denominators of both
short- and long-term loans. The currencies of all of the larger industrialized
countries have served, at one time or another, as denominators of Eurocurrency
loans.
The private markets have been less innovative in devising international
moneys for use as media of exchange than they have in devising units of account.
Where the national currency of one of the transactors has not been specified as
the currency of settlement, use of the dollar is apparently common in trade
transactions. Common as well in their respective areas are the French franc and
the Japanese yen. As is discussed below, there is no reason that SDR units and
ECUs might not be used as private means of settlement, but evidence of their
widespread employment in this way has not yet appeared. Of course, the service
of Eurocurrency denominated securities involves the passage of the appropriate
Eurocurrencies between the lenders and borrowers at prescribed times, and SDR
and ECU denominated loans are usually serviced with the currencies of one or
more industrialized countries.
For the store of value function of money at an international level, the private
markets employ a range of assets almost as wide as that used by their official
counterparts. The function is served, of course, by any durable asset that is
highly liquid in terms of the foreign moneys that the holder may require. Private
firms in many parts of the world hold dollar deposits to buffer their international
receipts and payments. They also hold deposits in currencies of other industri-
alized countries, and in gold, SDRs, and ECUs.
Private SDRs and ECUs must be carefully distinguished from official ones.
The official SDR, a credit in the IMF balance sheet accounts, is held only by
governments, the designated international institutions, and the IMF. Similarly,
the official ECU is a claim that is holdable only by governments participating in
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. Private SDRs and ECUs potentially
usable as media of exchange arise nonetheless when banks accept deposits
denominated in those units of account and promise to make payment in them. A
number of U.S. and European banks now engage in such business, and the IMF
publishes in International Financial Statistics a series of the London Interbank
Offer Rates on SDR deposits that goes back to 1982. In 1987 the authorities of
the Federal Republic of Germany ended their ban on the acceptance by German
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banks of ECU denominated deposits. The SDR and ECU are, of course,
composite moneys, with dollar values defined by their issuing authorities as
weighted averages of the daily dollar exchange rates of the included currencies.
Official SDRs and ECUs bear interest rates, for official uses, equivalent to
weighted average short-term interest rates on the currencies included in the
composites. Arbitrage theory suggests that private SDRs and ECUs will
necessarily also bear rates of interest that approximate averages of the interest
rates in the composite currencies due to the opportunity private traders have of
arbitraging between interest rates on the composites and those on bundles of the
currencies that make up the composites. In the case of the ECU, however, the
interest rate on the private unit will not be the same as that on the official unit
since interest on the latter is defined in terms of the central bank discount rates
of the included currencies, and these rates are not generally available to the
market for arbitraging purposes. Short-term interest rates on the private SDR and
ECU may be expected to approximate closely the weighted averages of the
several short-term, low-risk interest rates available to institutional investors.
Before 1971 the international monetary system had become increasingly dollar
centered. After 1958 and until the mid-1970s, for example, a growing share of
official international monetary reserves was held in dollar denomination. Most
governments used the dollar as the currency of intervention for fulfilling their
exchange rate stability obligations, and the dollar played the other roles, official
and private, that have been mentioned above. The dollar's convertibility to gold
at $35 per ounce was the monetary system's link to the traditional money metal.
With the severance of the dollar's link to gold and the disappearance of the par
value system of exchange rates, many observers characterized the new arrange-
ments as an international dollar standard, pure and simple. Such a characteriza-
tion, however, was not to be valid for long. Among factors contributing to an
erosion in the uniqueness of the dollar as an international monetary instrument
were (a) the giant fluctuations in the value of the dollar through the 1970s and
1980s; (b) the expansion of financial centers in London, on the continent, and in
Tokyo; (c) the emergence of the diversified Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets;
(d) the success of the European Monetary System; and (e) the shift of the
availability of exportable savings from the U.S. to Japan, Europe, and, for a
time, the petroleum exporting nations. Between 1979 and 1987 the dollar's share
in the foreign exchange component of the world's total official monetary reserves
declined from 73.2 to 67.1 percent, 2 and between 1984 and 1987 the dollar
denominated share of total international bond issues fell from 63.5 to 35.8
percent. 3 Whereas in the mid-1960s the dollar was almost alone among
2. The value of ECUs issued against dollars to members of the European Monetary Cooperation
Fund are counted as dollars in this tabulation, and all percentages are calculated when reserves have
been converted into SDR amounts. See id. at 68 (app. table 1.2).
3. 58 BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS ANN. REP. 126 (1988).
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Eurocurrencies, at the end of 1987 other currencies constituted 42 percent of the
Eurocurrency liabilities of banks reporting to the Bank for International
Settlements.4 At the end of the 1980s the monetary system must be characterized
as one in which blocs of currencies float in value against each other and in which
there are multiple major financial centers and multiple moneys available for
international use, both at the official and the private levels.
In these circumstances, what can be predicted for the future international
monetary roles of the dollar, other national currencies, the SDR, and the ECU?
The dollar's usefulness for this purpose has been somewhat impaired by mistakes
in the U.S. management of its value, but the currency continues to be used
internationally because monetary practices change very slowly and a satisfactory
substitute has not emerged. Protracted inflation in the United States from 1964 to
1981, and the dollar's associated volatility on the exchange markets in that and
in subsequent periods, have been cited as part of the rationale for the creation of
the European Monetary System and, with that system, the ECU. High demand
levels and incipient inflation in the United States in the 1960s led to the external
liquidity crisis of the United States that gave birth to the SDR and eventually to
the end of the par value exchange rate system. Price ceilings on bank deposits in
the United States in the early part of the great inflation of the mid-1960s and
1970s, augmented by inflation-induced U.S. and British capital export controls,
accelerated the appearance of Eurodollar banking that was followed by more
diversified Eurocurrency banking. The dollar's extended depreciation between
1971 and 1979 finally induced some diversification in the denomination of
official reserve assets by countries outside the United States even though that
diversification was offset by dollar acquisitions by some governments in order to
limit dollar depreciation.
Official holdings of foreign exchange and the use of particular currencies for
official international settlement purposes is, in the present context, a function of
the foreign exchange intervention decisions of governments. These, in turn,
depend upon the exchange rate policies those countries find attractive in
connection with their other micro- and macroeconomic policy strategies. It is
useful to think of the level and composition of governments' foreign exchange
reserve holdings as a residual after other policy decisions have been made in the
context of noncontrollable economic disturbances. The system, therefore, is not
very vulnerable to shifts of monetary reserves among currencies for capital gain
or interest earning possibilities, and financial authorities are not in search of
replacements for the international monetary media now in official use. Govern-
ments of countries that are inflation prone or heavily indebted of course seek an
increase in access to monetary reserves of some sort, but this is different from
dissatisfaction with the range of instruments that is available for performing
4. The figures for 1987 are from id. at 119.
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monetary functions. It is in the private markets that monetary evolution toward
the use of new instruments now seems most likely.
Private usage of dollars for transactions and store of value purposes is affected
by transactions needs, the utilities of various national moneys for transactions
purposes, and relative holding costs for the various currencies, where the holding
costs are composed of interest rates and expected exchange rate changes. World
cross-border bank deposits of nonbank agencies in all currencies, expressed in
dollar terms, have increased 75.6 percent, from 1982 to 1988, while total dollar
value of world exports, a crude measure of the demand for international money
for transactions purposes, increased by only a little over 50 percent. The share of
the cross-border holdings that is on deposit in the United States has increased
slightly, from 7.2 percent to 7.5 percent, in spite of strong appreciation in the
dollar value of the nondollar components of those balances. This demand for
dollars must be assumed to reflect the conflicting effects of changing ideas about
the utility of dollars as a monetary medium, relatively high U.S. interest rates,
and fears of further dollar depreciation in view of the sustained U.S. balance of
payments current account deficits. The dollar component of European cross-
border bank liabilities has, however, fallen between 1984 and 1987, when the
effects of changing exchange rates on the composition are excluded, being 57.0
percent in 1984 and only 40.9 percent at the end of 1987.6
The dollar share of issues in international bond markets has been declining for
several years, and the use of dollars to denominate the value of trade transactions
may be waning. Certainly private traders and investors in international markets
will not choose to employ as an international money a currency that is more
unstable in value against other major currencies than the other currencies are
among themselves, as the dollar has tended to be since 1971. If wide swings in
the dollar's value continue, the currency will be used less and less as a measure
of value and as a medium of exchange. Furthermore, private economic agents
will not hold liquid assets in dollars unless interest differentials in favor of the
dollar swing to offset recurring market fears of dollar depreciation. Whether or
not the United States and other governments can so manage their macro-
economic policies to reduce and contain pressures on dollar exchange rates while
still satisfying domestic demand management needs is to be seen. But in view of
the intractability of fiscal policy in the United States, and in some degree abroad,
and in view of persistently low private sector saving rates in the United States,
the country seems destined in the near future to remain a major importer of
capital. In these circumstances, stabilization of dollar exchange rates around
1988 levels without intolerably high interest rates in the United States does not
5. Calculated from IMF, INT'L FIN. STATISTICS 62 (1988).
6. Calculated from The Currency Composition of Reporting Banks' Cross-Border Positions, 58
BANK FOR INT'L SFTTLEMENTS ANN. REP. 119 (1988).
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appear sustainable. Greater stability for the dollar in the near future than in the
decade past cannot be taken for granted.
Can another national currency displace the dollar in its international usage?
The enormous expansion, at home and abroad, of Japanese financial institutions
suggests the yen as the leading dollar competitor. But variability of the yen in the
triangle of Asian, North American, and European currencies has been only
somewhat less than the variability of the dollar, and international usage of the yen
has long been inhibited by regulations consciously retained for that purpose by
Japan's Government. While international usage of the yen is growing, the
currency's place as more than a regionally important unit of account, medium of
exchange, and store of value seems doubtful.
The most likely candidates for increased international monetary usage in private
markets appear to be the moneys that are no nation's currency. The one of these
that has a deep monetary tradition and that inspires confidence for many is gold.
Gold, however, is coined in usable money sizes by only a few governments, and
those issues are purposefully kept small to enhance the numismatic collectors'
value of the coinage. Furthermore, gold has conditions of demand and supply
that are significantly independent of its monetary functions. Monetary distur-
bances arising from these nonmoney related causes have historically been a
source of criticism of the metal's use as a base for currency. In particular, gold
discoveries and changes in mining and refining technology have periodically
cheapened the metal while technologically revealed new industrial uses have
enhanced or reduced the demand. Observers throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries have used these unpredictable variations in gold's scarcity as
the basis for criticism of gold's use as money. As a medium that cannot be
reproduced by government recourse to the printing press, gold remains a widely
used store of liquid value against reproducible national currencies whose supplies
are persistently inflated. It is not much used any more as a medium of exchange
or unit of account, however, and only in a situation in which a number of
countries would experience hyperinflation does its international use for these
purposes seem likely to reappear.
The other non-national moneys that are employed to any extent in private
markets in the 1980s are the ECU and the SDR. Whereas the official ECU has
limited liquidity, being transferrable only among governments participating in
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the private ECU's use is not so
limited. The unit is, however, by its definition a composite of European money.
Should the ECU and the yen stabilize in value relative to each other while the
North American currencies vary widely against these other two legs of the
world's financial triangle, the ECU and the yen would undoubtedly gain in
international usage as units of account and media of exchange relative to the
dollar. Without another dramatic experience along those lines, however, both the
ECU and the yen seem likely to see their growth as international moneys limited
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to the regions where the trade of the countries issuing the underlying currencies
is dominant.
The SDR is in a different situation. As a unit of account averaging the moneys
of the five largest trading countries in the world, which are also countries that
include all of the world's leading financial centers, the SDR is uniquely a
globally important unit of account. Its definition as an average ensures that
when any change occurs in the exchange rate between two currencies that are
included in the composite, the SDR changes value less against each of those
two currencies than they change against each other. As a measure of central
tendency, it tends to move in value against each of its elements over time by
less than the constituent currencies move against each other. It has, therefore,
particular attractiveness as a unit of account and a store of value due to its
relative value stability.
Furthermore, that property of the SDR that makes it desirable as a unit of
account and liquid store of value is not lost, as might appear to be the case, if the
SDR gains usage as a medium of exchange. While as a medium that can be freely
traded against goods and services and other moneys, the SDR will take on a life
of its own and have its value influenced by its own supply and demand
conditions, its definition in terms of a fixed weighted average of other moneys
provides arbitrage possibilities that will sustain the parity of the SDR with its
defined currency bundle.
Whether or not national central banks will undertake to regulate SDR banking
and limit, in their respective areas, SDR credit creation, seems likely to depend
on whether or not SDRs come into usage for purely domestic transactions. If
SDRs become an important unit for pricing or for settlements within a country,
one must expect that the process of credit creation in the unit will become a
matter of interest to that country's central bank and government. On the other
hand, so long as the composite currency is used primarily for international
pricing and settlements, it is reasonable to believe that bank assets and liabilities
in SDRs will be left free of national regulations, much as Eurocurrency banking
has been left free during the past thirty years.
Increased banking in SDRs that is relatively free of governmental regulation,
therefore, seems a development that is quite possible and one that will be
accelerated by continued large variability in the exchange rates between the
currencies of the leading industrial countries. Success among the industrialized
countries in "harmonizing" their macroeconomic policies while stabilizing their
exchange rates will postpone growth in usage of the SDR. Governments,
however, are still beholden to the perceived wants of the national constituencies
that elect them, and this constraint, together with substantial ignorance about
how the market systems function, make the international coordination of policies
toward the end of greater global stability very difficult. It will therefore be
surprising if significant variability in the exchange rates of the industrialized
countries can be long suppressed.
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Should use of the SDR for private purposes grow in the next few decades, new
questions would be precipitated, such as whether there should be international
regulation of the unofficial markets in this international asset. If international
regulation of SDR banking should be thought necessary, the IMF would be the
natural regulatory agency. Consideration of the assignment of such important
monetary authority to this international institution would then surely be accom-
panied by calls for reform of the IMF's governance. That is another story and
would provide another cause for cooperation between lawyers and economists. If
this point in history should be reached, Sir Joseph Gold's text giving birth to the
SDR will long since have added much to human welfare.
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